3.
Let us pause a moment to examine the salient points and implications of this interesting work by Korsch. First of all, we must question the meaning of reducing all the theoretical positions of German Social Democracy and of the Second International (whether right or left) to passive and non-committal conceptions because they limit themselves to reflecting on the elapsed stages of the real movement (which for Korsch is represented by class conflicts, by practical and political clashes among the various tendencies and currents within the labor movement). Certainly, it helps here to consider the particular time in which Korsch wrote these lines. We are in 1933, the period immediately following the rise of fascism in Germany. The success of the national-socialist dictatorship had not yet destroyed the residual hopes for a workers' insurrection. This is why it is necessary to carry out the whole theoretical discussion in terms of an analysis of the present in its most empirical, particular aspects, which are absolutely not deducible from a general and abstract theoretical construction. Even the appeal to the Sorelian "myth" and to Lenin's "activist-materialist" position [12] must be seen in this perspective as meant to stress the urgency to mobilize workers for the struggle against fascism. But however necessary, this rigorous historical consideration is not enough. In fact, this work contains a contradictory motive that cannot be resolved purely by reference to the political exigencies of the moment, since it is a constant feature of Korsch's discourse which, despite its greater complexity and breadth, he shares with a large part of the communist and socialist left between the two wars.
[13] Korsch seems to grasp the need for a political and revolutionary interpretation of the "scientific description" of Capital, and thus to read the critique of political economy in connection with the theory of classes and of revolution. But, in the rush to bring the discussion, without interruption back to the requirements of a "practical theory of proletarian revolution," he ends up by avoiding one of the crucial dimensions in the work of the mature Marx. It is precisely by doing so that he can uncompromisingly reject all theories of the crisis, regardless of their methodological and epistemological foundations, as abstract constructions which, as such, can only be passive reflections of the real movement. Korsch thus avoids the complex problem of the "method of exposition"[l4] when, in his urgency to work out an economic analysis able to provide a "practical theory of revolution" supported by an "activist-materialist attitude," he reads the dialectical method of presentation of the mature Marx as a mere allegory [15] meant to rouse the proletariat's will and revolutionary spirit. [16] Thus, Korsch ruled out the possibility of differentiation between the various methodological and epistemological foundations of the different theories of the crisis which throw light on their function within the general vision of the historical movement and the relationship between theory and practice. As a result, Korsch did not see that Luxemburg's theory of the crash was different from the one formulated by Kautsky in the 1906 preface to the fifth German edition of Engels' Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, not only because of a difference of "attitude" (which is, in the last analysis, a subjective difference), but rather because of a different value assigned to the function of economic "description" within Marxist theory. Luxemburg never conceived of the model she described in the Accumulation of Capital as a pure and simple "reflection" of historical and empirical evolution of the capitalist mode of production. Rather, against Kautsky, she always refused to attribute the character of fetishistic objectivity to economic laws. [17] 
4.
Returning to Korsch, there is another surprising point in his exposition which indirectly confirms the shortcomings of his approach to the theory of the crisis: the association of Fritz Steinberg and Henryk Grossmann as "epigones of the Luxemburgian theory." Actually, these two economists were so far from being epigones that, at the acme of the problem of the crisis in 1929, they engaged in one of the harshest and most interesting polemics on imperialism. In his vast work on imperialism, [18] Steinberg had taken up and integrated Luxemburg's partial revision of Marxist theory which related expanded reproduction and expansion in "non-capitalist areas." [19] Grossmann, however, maintained that the capitalist system's tendency to crisis and "collapse" could only be explained on the basis of the Marxist theory of value. "The law of value," writes Grossmann in his basic work on the law of accumulation and the collapse of the capitalist system, "dominates the entire economic process of the capitalist mechanism and, since its dynamic and developmental tendencies cannot be understood except on the basis of this law, its end-the collapsemust also be explained on the basis of the law of value." [20] The error of Luxemburg and Steinberg-which led them to a revision and "integration" of Marx's work on expanded reproduction-was the result of an erroneous assumption: in Luxemburg's Accumulation of Capital as well as in Steinberg's Imperialism the crisis was not explained in terms of production, but in terms of the market. This is why it is impossible to pull together the continuity and the structural connection between the reproductive process and the capital-labor relations on the one hand, and the need to introduce the safety-valve of "non-capitalist areas" (resulting in a significant twist of the Marxist problem of production and reproduction into a problem of "realization" of surplus value.) Through a systematic self-reflexion, however, Grossmann succeeded in posing the question in terms of an analysis of the relations of production, within whose dynamic he sought the general developmental tendency of the capitalist mode of production. [21] Basing his work on the two-fold dimension of determining reality and of abstract generality (with respect to the historical and empirical movement) of the law of value, he ended up connecting it to the theory of the crisis by means of the law of accumulation. "The great significance of Marx's work lies precisely in the fact that it is able to explain all the phenomena of the capitalist mode of production on the basis of the law of value." [22] The "Marxist theory of collapse is . . . a necessary supposition for the comprehension of the Marxist theory of the crisis and it is intimately connected to it. The solution to both problems is in the Marxist law of accumulation, which constitutes the central idea of Capital and is in turn founded on the law of value."[23] Thus, far from being the work of an "epigone" Grossmann's book carried out the "return to Marx" prefigured by Luxemburg against the reformist revisionism of Bernstein and the Austro-Marxist "neo-harmonizers" [24] as well as Kautsky's pseudo-orthodox and positivist scholasticism. Thus, Grossmann salvaged Rosa's political application, recasting it on a former analytical and methodological basis. Not by chance, it is this work of Grossmann which, in the early thirties (a year after the appearance of the previously discussed article by Korsch revived an important discussion within Linkskommunismus on the connection between the theory of the crash and revolutionary subjectivity.
5.
The protagonists of the polemic carried out in the columns of the "Rätecorrespondenz", the theoretical organ of the "council communists," are Anton Pannekoek and Paul Mattick. In his contribution to the discussion, Pannekoek addressed to Grossmann a criticism similar to the one that Korsch had made regarding all theories of the crisis with major economic pretenses but with far less clarity. Starting with the assumption that "the question of the necessity and inevitability of the capitalist collapse, and of the way in which this is understood is, for the working class and for its understanding and its tactics, the most important of all questions," [25] he then ended up criticizing Grossmann from a basically external perspective. [26] Pannekoek's criticisms of Grossmann are basically that he wants to deduce the end of capitalism "from a purely economic viewpoint" (and thus of conceiving the crash independently of human intervention"), and of reducing the class struggle to an "economistic" contest, i.e., of defining it as a struggle for wages and reduction of working hours. Thus, he ended up liquidating, more thoroughly and radically than Korsch had done, the whole theory of the crash from Luxemburg to Grossmann, by anchoring the theory to a deterministic and "bourgeois" concept of "historical necessity." [27] On a closer analysis, however, it turns out that this criticism of Grossmann's economism" could at the same time be addressed to Pannekoek since it was he himself who was tied to a restricted "bourgeois" concept of economics. This is precisely the point of Mattick's important criticism. Pannekoek, Mattick points out, did not succeed in understanding the dialectical character of Grossmann's development, founded on a specifically Marxist methodological base. The method by which the critique of political economy proceeds is not aimed at the historical and empirical description of real processes, but at the abstract isolation of certain fundamental moments, in order to define the unity of the laws of movement of capitalist society. "For Grossmann, too," notes Mattick, "there are no purely economic problems. Yet, that does not prevent him, in his analysis of the law of accumulation, from methodologically limiting himself to the definition of purely economic presuppositions and thus to theoretically reach an objective limit of the system. The theoretical understanding whereby the capitalist system must necessarily collapse because of its internal contradictions does not imply at all that the real collapse is an automatic process, independent of men.' [28] The limits of Pannekoek's Marxism can be seen when, after having ruled out any "practical utility" for the theory of the crisis, he goes on to propose a positive solution to the problem of the connection between economics and politics: between the objective and subjective moments. Starting from the assumption that "Marxist economics cannot be grasped without an understanding of the historical and materialist way of thinking," he immediately seeks to resolve, in an undifferentiated unity, the objective-subjective, beingconsciousness, economic-political relationship: "The economy, as a totality of men who work and make do for their basic needs, and politics (in a broad sense) as a totality of men who work and struggle as a class for their basic needs, constitute a single sphere developing according to precise laws." [29] What we have here is, on the one hand, an undifferentiated unity, and on the other, an abstract dualism of two camps which, in terms so defined, remain absolutely unmediated. If economics can be reduced to a simply laboring and instrumental activity, and politics to a mere autonomous and voluntary activity, their unity cannot be other than an empty form or a moral postulate. To the declared unity of theory and practice we can then compare, in Pannekoek, the opposite couple, or better, the hypostatised polar copresence, economism-voluntarism.
But, and what is most important, this incongruence is neither a result of personal irrelevance nor an exclusively historical limitation of a discussion of the 193Os. [30] Actually, the same type of criticism of the theory of the crash and the same type of appeal to subjectivity can be found in reformist theoreticians of social democracy such as Hilferding and Braunthal. Even before the Marx-Renaissance characterized by the works of the young Lukács and Korsch and destined to assume major proportions with the publication of Marx's early philosophic writings, the Austro-Marxist theoreticians were the ones who inaugurated in European Marxism that "season of subjectivity" consisting of an active re-reading of Marxist work, filtered through neo-Kantian themes. [31] Although it represented a change in emphasis in the theoretical and political debate within the labor movement, both in the neo-Kantian Austro-Marxists and in the majority wing of the Linkskommunismus this appeal to subjectivity had as a consequence an epistemological restriction of the field defined in Marx as the social relations of production. The sociological and empirical analysis of the "real" comes up against the vindication of the (ethical-universal) subjective factor. Thus, instead of characterizing the tendential laws of the mode of production, economic analysis ends up as an exercise in microsociology. To the empirical reduction of categorical abstractions that takes from reality its structuring moments, corresponds the deobjectified resolution of the political moment into an ethical and transcendental moment. The same split also appears in the definition of class: the latter splits into a "material" moment within production (the labor force), and a "spiritual" moment which, through its universality, transcends the empirical levels of the material and productive condition of the class (the universal human "will" of the proletariat, "class consciousness" as a reassembling of the dissected members of the human essence). Thus, the genesis of class consciousness it not explained in terms of the process of production and reproduction, and from within the objectivity of social relations, but is presupposed as a result of an irreducible autonomy that at a certain point of development, makes the qualitative jump which breaks the quantitative uniformity of the empirical world. In the polemic concerning Grossmann's book we are confronted by a sharp contrast between two theoretical perspectives. On one side is Pannekoek's perspective, which represents the process of attaining autonomy by the will from economic and empirical conditions according to the indicated dualistic scheme (subsequently resolved by the claim of an undifferentiated unity of the two moments). The other side is represented by Mattick, who sees the genesis of class consciousness (and thus the passage from the "class in itself' into the "class for itself') as the result of an objective process, whose laws of movement are neither resolved nor reflected in a movement of abstract consciousness or in an abstract unity of consciousness and objective conditions, but in the articulated and differentiated context of production relations. Only within this dynamic can the class struggle be explained since it is none other than the effect of the contradictions inherent in these productive relations.
6.
In a letter to Mattick of June 21, 1931, Grossmann himself clarified this controversial point in his polemic against the Austro-Marxists. "Obviously," he wrote "I am far from holding that capitalism is destined to collapse 'by itself or 'automatically,' as Hilferding and other socialists (Braunthal) claim in taking issue with my book. It can be demolished only through the class struggle of the working class. But I wanted to show that class struggle alone is not enough. The will to demolish is not enough. In the initial phases of capitalist development such a will cannot even arise... Obviously, as a dialectical Marxist, I know that both sides of the process, the objective and the subjective, are reciprocally influenced. In the class struggle these factors fuse. One cannot 'wait' until first the 'objective' conditions are there and only then allow the 'subjective' ones to operate. That would be an inadequate, mechanical conception which is alien to me. But for the purposes of analysis, I must utilize the abstract procedure of isolating particular elements in order to show the essential functions of each element. Lenin often speaks of the revolutionary situation which must be objectively given as a presupposition for the active and victorious intervention of the proletariat. My theory of collapse does not aim at the exclusion of this active intervention, but rather wants to show when and under what conditions such an objectively given revolutionary situation can and does arise." [32] Here Grossmann laid the foundations for a possible connection between the critique of political economy and the theory of revolution. A fundamental and irreducible moment of this connection should have been the dialectical representation. As Roman Rosdolsky has shown in his work on the genesis of Capital, the distinction between "method of research" and "method of presentation" in the critique of political economy-a distinction which underlies the other, also decisive distinction between the genetic and morphological levels, the historical and the logical moment [33] -does not have purely epistemological significance, but also political and revolutionary relevance. [34] If the selection of an abstract criterion of exposition is not arbitrary (nor the result of purely methodological considerations), but is connected to the need to conceptually represent the process of real abstraction; and if the dialectical exposition of Capital describes the development of categorical norms which, in their logical structure, express the real domination of abstraction in capitalist society, then the critique of political economy is, through the dialectical representation, a penetration and at the same time a criticism of an subject-less totality regulated by the domination of the abstract (commodity abstract labor). Thus, the critique of political economy is, on the one hand, a penetration of categorical objectivity as a "mode of being" of a totality specified in a historically determined present and in its reified "forms of thought" [35] while on the other hand, it is an immanent critique of this "objectivity" in as much as it is the theoretical expression of a real negativity and is a shift to an alternate logical and historical process having its genesis in the framework of abstract labor. [36] It is at the same time a critique of "consciousness" and a critical theory of revolution. To the extent that they reconstruct the fundamental components of Marx's mature research (the theory of value and of money, the essence-phenomenon relation, logical time-historical time, use value-exchange value), recent studies on the genesis of the structure of Capital and on the epistemological status of Marxist theory offer the possibility of extracting from the very critique of political economy the fundamental categories of political theory, of the theory of classes and of the theory of the state. In its double character as a theory of real abstraction and as a critique of the forms of reified consciousness (understood, not subjectively, but as effective "modes of being" of individuals and classes in the historically specified totality of capitalist society), the critique of political economy constitutes the obligatory point of departure for a scientific foundation of class consciousness or for what today is called "the problem of constitution." [37] Returning this complex of problems (and tasks) to the theoretical and political discussion connected to our historical present urgently demands the theoretically elaborated and historically relevant recognition of the problem of method within Marxism and the labor movement. This is necessary to locate those moments and those epistemological efforts will eventually contain either the posing of the problem of constitution (and of the critical connection between political economy and the revolutionary theory at its foundation), or the presuppositions for a materialist treatment of the problem. Important beginnings in this direction can be traced to the until recently neglected works of Henryk Grossmann and Paul Mattick. Paradoxically, it is precisely the fact that their economic 'models' appear 'closed' and unitary (because, unlike "neo-Marxist" theories of capitalist development, they do not present any divisions between production and markets) that offers the possibility of basing a specific and non-generic (ethical and subjectivist) level of politics on them-despite their theoretical limits and historical conditioning. [38] The categorical re-examination of the capitalist system as a contradictory whole defined by the overall process of social reproduction and expressed on the historical and structural level as a tendency to crisis brings us back to the very current theme of the state and of its function within the mechanism of evaluation and socialization of labor. To the extent that it is a disclosure, and thus an anticipation rather than a "reflection" of the essential structural factors of the real historical process of capitalist society, the abstract categorical description is not self-sufficient but refers back to the dimension of class struggle.
7.
Pannekoek could accuse Grossmann of being tied to a positivist and bourgeois conception of "social necessity" because he had omitted the critical aspect of Grossmann's exposition. He had taken Grossmann's work as an abstract, empirical and descriptive model and thus he ended up by treating it as a manual of political economy. [39] Thus, in the same manner one could accuse Marx of economism for having described, in the four volumes of Capital, the development of bourgeois society as the development of categorical forms changed by economics. This type of objection does not take into account the preliminary methodological warning implicit in the subtitle "critique of political economy." At the same time, this type of objection precludes the possibility of understanding its profound political significance (not to be understood as flat instrumentality). Thus, Pannekoek's criticism stems from his failure to grasp the main point of the mode of presentation of the critique of political economy. "It comes to the surface here," writes Marx in Capital, "in a purely economic way-i.e., from the bourgeois point of view, within the limitations of capitalist understanding, from the standpoint of capitalist production itself-that it has its barrier, that it is relative that it is not an absolute, but only a historical mode of production corresponding to a definite limited epoch in the development of the material requirements of production." [40] Having understood the "theory of the crash" as the self-criticism of the capitalist system at the level of "abstract description" (and thus as a return to its transitional historical character of the mode of production based on commodity exchange), Grossmann can avoid the error usually committed by many "Marxist" economists: to separate the theory of value-the cornerstone of the critique of political economy-from the materialist conception of history. The development of historical materialism into a science coincides with the understanding of the transitory nature of bourgeois society. Sismondi "foresaw" this at the level of a philosophy of history, in the "cellular form" (Zellenform) of the mode of production, in the form of commodity production, in the value form of commodities, and in value taking the form of capital. [41] Grossmann's "method of isolation" represents the contradictory unity of use value and exchange value only in its economic aspect, thus as a problem of the organic composition of capital and, finally, as an economic tendency toward crisis (tendential fall of the rate of profit)-a result of the contradiction inherent in the very mechanism of accumulation. In its "natural" character, the historical past of the capitalist social formation thus appears as a tendency within the economic heart of the material base, as a "natural" connection to the crisis which leads to collapse. Grossmann deduces the social tendency through which this economic tendency is realized: the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production; from within this critical "self-description." The latter is based on the historical materialist moment of the self-foundation of political economy, independent of the shift from the understanding on the level of philosophy of history to the dialectical and categorical self-understanding of the historically determined and transitional character of bourgeois society. To the extent that it defines the essential contradictory character of the capitalist mode of production at the general social level, this contradiction between productive forces and relations of production can neither be relegated to the competitive capitalist phase as Panzieri and other "new left" theoreticians nor reduced to a metaphorical objectification of the capital-labor conflict as many exponents of Linkskommunismus maintained. Within the capitalist system, it is impossible to suppress the "natural character" of the process or to control it through planning, in that it is impossible to emerge from "pre-history" while remaining within the limits of commodity production. And, if the autonomous moment of the representation is not merely an empirical abstraction but expresses the real process whereby the domination of the abstract becomes autonomous in bourgeois society, then the constitution of the proletariat as a "class for itself' cannot be originally given in the "relations of production" as the effect of a manichean split between capital and "workers' autonomy," but is rather the result of a long historical process of emancipation from within the real domination of abstract labor, in philosophical terms: the process whereby the proletariat becomes subject, is the result of a process without a subject. Thus, this process has produced a historical present characterized and specified by growing mass participation (protagonisms). But without the "natural character" of capitalism this participation would be a mere idealist category i.e., practically inconceivable in the past (its genesis) as well as in the present (its realization). Despotic socialization, in its contradictory unity, fulfils rather than suppresses the fundamental historical contradiction between productive forces and relations of production (which is not limited to the competitive phase but is inherent in the dichotomous structure of the system's "cellular form:" commodities). State intervention in the economy functions as a "plan" only in the technocratic ideology of late capitalism. In reality, since it is itself a counter-tendency, this intervention merely mediates other counter-tendencies to the tendential fall of the rate of profit. The formally unifying character of despotic socialization leads to ideologizing in the category of the "plan" the real function of the state as the regulator of the overall process of reproduction. Thus, it prevents an understanding of the unity and contradiction of the productive forces and of the relations of production within the new configuration which this process assumes in modern organized capitalism.
8.
Paradoxically, the weak point of Panzieri's argument (which, apart from the obvious historical differences, turns out to be strikingly similar to Korsch's) lies in its most vital political contribution: the call for an antidogmatic renewal of the Marxist discourse based on the translation of the categories pertaining to the critique of political economy into those of revolutionary theory. Although starting from the Marxian connection between the theory of capitalist development and the theory of social revolution which Korsch had violently criticized, [42] Panzieri finds himself in the company of the Korschian theoretical left in misinterpreting the significance and the function of the representation. If in Korsch the categorical representation is reduced to a mere reflection and the theory of the crisis to an objectifying allegory of real class conflicts, in Panzieri the development of the presentation from the first to the third volume of Capital is directly associated with the real historical development of capital from the competitive to the monopolistic phase. In order to validate his reading of the three volumes of Capital as a description of the "historical process of the growing cohesion of the system" [43] which would have led, beyond Marx's own expectations, to the complete realization of the law of value as the "law of the plan," Panzieri quotes an important passage from the third volume: "In our description of production relations, they are converted into entities and rendered independent in relation to the agents of production," writes Marx at the end of his chapter on the trinitary formula, "we leave aside the manner in which the interrelations, due to the world market, its conjunctures, movements of market-prices, periods of credit, industrial and commercial cycles, alterations of prosperity and crisis, appear to them as overwhelming natural laws that irresistibly enforce their will over them, and confront them as blind necessity. We leave this aside because the actual movement of competition belongs beyond our scope and we need present only the inner organization of the capitalist mode of production, in its ideal average as it were." [44] But the meaning of this passage goes in precisely the opposite direction from that supposed by Panzieri: here we are not dealing-even 'abstractly' -with reproducing the phases of a real historical movement, but with abstracting from it, as a complex of empirical phenomena, in order to describe the capitalist mode of production in its essential moments. The fact that the objectification of capital in the trinitary formula "appears. . . only at the highest level of capitalist development characterized by interest-producing capital" [45] does not mean that the trinitary formula reflects or captures the real historical complexity of this level of development. Rather, in the general framework of the Marxist dialectical representation, the trinitary formula represents the synthesis of the forms of "necessary appearance deduced from the abstract totality of the concept of capital. [46] The relation between the essence and phenomenon obtaining between the general concept of capital and "independently given capitals"-competition-does not refer to the historical and genetic, but rather to the logical and cognitive level. [47] If, on the one hand, the categorical structure cannot be flattened out as a reflection of the real movement, on the other hand, the logical and structural domination of a form of the process defines, but does not resolve or suppress, the variety and complexity of an historical phase. The political function of the method of presentation is not in mechanically superimposing itself on the method of research, but in providing the foundation and setting for the latter. The dimension of political tactics has a meaning and a place only within this difference, in the same way that, on the "cognitive level", science has a meaning and a place in the hiatus existing between phenomenon and essence: "Every science would be superfluous if the essence of things and their phenomenal form coincided." [48] 9.
In drawing some provisional conclusions, it would be appropriate to deal briefly with the status of the theory of the crisis in relation to the theme of "constitution." Grossmann's and Mattick's theories, whose importance we have emphasized, are not without defects and ideological deformations resulting from the historical circumstances within which they developed. Thus, in Grossmann, despite repeated theoretical warnings, the genesis of proletarian class consciousness is directly and exclusively connected with crisis periods. Similarly, Mattick sharply separates revolutionary periods defined by economic crises from non-revolutionary periods defined by productive expansion and the consequent prevalence of reformist lines within the labor movement. [49] These claims undoubtedly run the risk of an objectivist and mechanical reduction of the problem of constitution. Yet, this direct linking of periods of crisis with the genesis of class consciousness cannot be regarded as peculiar and limited to Grossmann and Mattick as theoreticians of the collapse. The same "catastrophic" interdependence can be found in Lukács, who was the first to pose the problem of constitution in the light of Capital: "The proletariat is then at one and the same time the product of the permanent crisis in capitalism and the instrument of those tendencies driving capitalism toward crisis. . . By recognizing its situation it acts. By combating capitalism it discovers its own mission in society. But the class consciousness of the proletariat, the truth of the process 'as subject' is itself far from stable and constant; it does not advance according to mechanical laws. It is the consciousness of the dialectical process itself: it is likewise a dialectical concept. For the active and practical side of class consciousness, its true essence, can only become visible in its authentic form when the historic process imperiously requires it to come into force, i.e., when an acute crisis the economy drives it to action." [50] Thus, even in their shortcomings, the works of Grossmann and Mattick belong with the most advanced level of discussion during the 1920s and 1930s. Although Mattick has only posed the problem of the state in its present for of capitalist organization, the so-called mixed economy, its richness can be measured ex negativo by comparing it with some of Korsch's essays on the state written during his American exile and published in Living Marxism (edited by Mattick himself). [51] Here Korsch develops some ideas on the state by developing and elaborating ideas from some of his other works. The importance of these articles lies in the fact that they demonstrate the overriding importance of the level of representation for the theme of the state. In his "Marxism and the Present Task of the Proletarian Class Struggle,' [52] Korsch counterposes Marx as the "theoretician of the proletariat" to Marx the "radical-bourgeois publicist" (referring to Marx's contributions in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung and in the New York Daily Tribune) and traces the dualism to the Jacobin model of revolution adopted by the founders scientific socialism. Korsch can put forth this scheme because he hypostatizes to the level of a complete and permanent theory the ideas on the state expressed by Marx and Engels in the Vormärz, without seeing the possibility of reconsidering the problem on the basis of their later critique of politic economy. Having established a relation of simple reversal between civil society and the state, with an explicit anti-state bias, [53] Korsch runs into when he considers the original contradiction of Marxism: since, as theory, it is the reflection of a real process, it cannot also be a theory of proletarian and communist revolution (since the latter has not yet occurred). Thus, up to now Marxism has existed as the reflection of another revolution, the capitalist and bourgeois revolution. Unable to grasp the practical and political function the dialectical mode of exposition as distinct from the "method of research" Korsch posits a relation of mere "reflection" or simple "correspondence" between the level of categorical abstractions and the level of empirical fact. Hence, the essential simplicity with which he sees that specific historical form of real abstraction represented by the state. The latter is not considered in the light of the overall structure of the abstract in the conception of the mature Marx. but in terms of the immediate counter-position of state and civil society paralleling that between speculation and reality. [54] Thus, the attempting to diachronically dilute the dialectical categories of Marxism in order to re-adapt them pragmatically to the needs of a 'practical theory of proletarian revolution,' Korsch flattens out the dialectical problems of historical constitution (which marks the indirect phases of the passage from factory struggles to overall social struggle; from economic to political struggles). and turns them into positivist problems of empirical specification.' The class struggle is thus simplified in a series of empirically grounded actions set loose in different spatial-temporal locations, the multiplicititv of which is never connected with the morphological context of the crisis: the unifying moment of the historical present. The tragically impotent outcome of Korsch's thought shows, therefore, how the separation of the theory of social revolution-the theory of classes and of the state-from the critique of political economy and its resulting theory of the crisis paradoxically produces a loss of specificity in precisely that political dimension which initially was to be privileged. [55] What remains out of consideration is mainly the function of the state in the mature Marxian conception: this is a problem that theory must finally deal with. The state emerges from the representation of the overall process of social reproduction as the supreme expression of the reality of the abstraction and of its effective complex domination over society. As the last peak of the logical and historical process of socialization of capital, and thus of the real universalization of the domination of the abstract, the state emerges as background to the critique of political economy; a regulating instance and, at the same time, a generalized expression of the crisis. [2] Ibid., pp. 286-287n.
[3] Ibid., p. 284.
[4] This can be seen in Panzieri's other important work, "SuIl'uso Capitalistico della Macchine nel Neocapitalismo," in La Ripresa del Marxismo-Leninismo in Italia, op.cit., pp. 148ff.
[5] R. Panzieri, "Plusvalore e Pianificazione," op.cit., p. 270. This rather substantial revision of Marxism was not merely an historical correction (i.e.. an adjustment of Marx's theory in terms of post-war capitalist developments). It upset the fundamental methods of dialectical exposition (Darstellung) of the critique of political economy. This exposition is "dialectical" in that it expresses the movement of negativity immanent to the general concept of capital and to the structure of commodities as the "cellular form" of capitalist society. Thus, the dialectical quality of this "method of exposition" consists in its comprehension of the movement of categories as self-contradictory movement of capital, as a self-criticism of the system in terms of the very categorical objectivity, the very "bourgeois point of view." Cf. Capital, Vol. III (New York 1967), p. 259. This self-criticism refers to the historical, and thus transitional, character of the mode of production based on commodity exchange. For Marx, "First of all, there is a limit, no inherent to production generally, but to production founded on capital." Cf. K. Marx Grundrisse (Middlesex, 1973), p. 415. The horizon of this limit, which is represented by capital itself, and the self-contradictory movement of capital is shown by Marx in the dialectic of limit (Grenze) and obstacle (Schranke). "To begin with: capital forces the workers beyond necessary labour to surplus labour. Only in this way does it realize itself, and create surplus value. But on the other hand, it presupposes necessary labour only to the extent and insofar as it is surplus labour and the latter is realizable as surplus labour. It posits surplus labour, then, as a condition of this necessary, and surplus labour as a limit (Grenze) of objectified labour (vergegenstandlichte Arbeit), of value as such. When it can no longer posit value it cannot posit necessary labour; and given its foundation, it cannot be otherwise. It therefore restricts labour and the creation of value-by an artificial check, as the English express it-and it does so on the same grounds as and to the same extent that it posits surplus labour and surplus value. By its nature, therefore, s posits a barrier (Schranke) to labour and value-creation, in contradiction to its tendency to expand them boundlessly. And in as much as it both posits a barrier specific to itself, and on the other side equally drives over and beyond every barrier, it is the living contradiction." "Since value forms the foundation of capital," continues Marx in the note at the foot of the page, "and since it therefore necessarily exists only through an exchange for counter-value, it thus necessarily repels itself from itself. A universal capital (Universalkapital), one without alien capital: confronting it, which it exchanges-and from the present standpoint, nothing confronts it but wage labourers or itself-is therefore a non-thing. The reciprocal exclusion of capitals is already contained in capital [emphasis added-G.M.) as realized exchange value" (Ibid., p. 421). It is evident that the profound dialectical significance (not reducible to an 'allegory' or to metaphor') of this "exposition" would collapse if the limit to the development of capital were not provided by "capital itself." The collapse of the limit-obstacle dialectic would present difficulties for an analysis of the movement of capital, and thus also for the theoretical possibility of critique of political economy.
[6] This argument was developed by Dario Lanyard in his introduction to R. Panzieri {8] For Korsch it could be said that "the entire historical development of socialist theories of the crisis, from Fourier and Sismondi through the various chronological phases of Marx's and Engels' theory, the 'Marxist" and epigone phase, and up to Steinberg and Grossmann, Lederer and Naphtali, can be seen as a mere passive reflection of the objective economic developments that had preceded them. From the same perspective and beyond the confines of the theory of the crisis, one could also see all of the major struggles that have taken place within the socialist movement in the last forty years as mere derivative phenomena and reflections of crises that have immediately preceded them in the cycle of capitalist crisis" (op.cit., p. 93). Clearly, Korsch's critique is more complex and articulate (especially since he is not hindered by the illusion of being able to find a revolutionary version of the theory of the crisis) but essentially it is no different from an anonymous article in the same journal: "Die Grundlagen amer revolutionären Krisentheorie," Proletarier Zeitschrift..., 1(1933); now in Korsch, Mattick-Pannekoek, op.cit., pp. 71ff.
[9] Korsch, op.cit., p. 96.
[10] Ibid., p, 97.
[11] Ibid., pp. 97-98. [14] The difference between the method of research and the method of exposition is spelled out by Marx in the Postscript (January 1873) to the second German edition of Capital: "the method of presentation," writes Marx, 'must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its different forms of development, to trace their interconnections. Only after this work is done can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere apriori construction." Marx, Capital, Vol. I (Moscow, 1965), p. 19. For problems connected to the above distinction and the general relation between Logic and History in Marx, see C. Luporini, "Marx secondo Marx," in Dialettica e Materialismo (Rome, 1975), pp. 215ff.
[15] This pragmatic reduction of the dialectical and morphological aspect of the critique of political economy is a to pos which connects the European "theoretical left" (often through Sorel, but in forms and ways which still need to be historically specified) to Bernstein and to the revisionist current of social democracy. Korsch's reference to Sorel should be historically (and theoretically) clarified in connection with the Bernsteinian revision of the theme of "industrial democracy" which constitutes, next to the anarcho-syndicalist vein, the other source of Korsch's "conception of the councils" derived from the "Fabian Society." Cf. 
